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ABSTRACT
The ever increasing volume of data in digital forensic investiga-
tion is one of the most discussed challenges in the field. Usually,
most of the file artefacts on seized devices are not pertinent to the
investigation. Manually retrieving suspicious files relevant to the
investigation is akin to finding a needle in a haystack. In this paper,
a methodology for the automatic prioritisation of suspicious file
artefacts (i.e., file artefacts that are pertinent to the investigation)
is proposed to reduce the manual analysis effort required. This
methodology is designed to work in a human-in-the-loop fashion.
In other words, it predicts/recommends that an artefact is likely
to be suspicious rather than giving the final analysis result. A su-
pervised machine learning approach is employed, which leverages
the recorded results of previously processed cases. The process of
features extraction, dataset generation, training and evaluation are
presented in this paper. In addition, a toolkit for data extraction
from disk images is outlined, which enables this method to be inte-
grated with the conventional investigation process and work in an
automated fashion.
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1 INTRODUCTION
“Big digital forensic data” is a challenge faced by law enforcement
agencies around the world as the prevalence of digital devices ever
increases [19]. The volume of data requiring analysis during digital
forensic investigations is ever increasing. How to quickly detect
pertinent file artefacts is a problem calling to be solved. A variety
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of solutions such as automation, data reduction, centralised digital
evidence processing, data deduplication, triage, etc., have been
proposed and developed in recent years.
Beebe et al. [2] outlined how the automation of forensic processes
is important. Numerous automation tools have been developed by
researchers in the field. However, independent automatic tools are
showing very little impact on the efficiency of the investigative
process. As the formats used by these tools vary, this leads to the
issue that investigators are left to manually figure out the clues from
the analyses results [3]. Merging the disparate formatted results
from various tools is also overly arduous and time consuming [5].
The Cyber-Investigation Analysis Standard Expression (CASE)1, a
community-developed standard format, is attempting to bridge this
gap.
For reducing the digital forensic backlogs, the first operational
Digital Forensics as a Service (DFaaS) system, Hansken, was imple-
mented by Netherlands Forensics Institute (NFI) in 2014 [26, 27].
DFaaS is a cloud based solution, analysing forensic data and sharing
the results on a centralised sever. It enables easier information shar-
ing between investigators and detectives, which is one manner that
improves overall efficiency over traditional systems. Based on the
DFaaS paradigm, data deduplication was proposed for reducing the
time repeatedly acquiring and analysing known file artefacts [25].
Several experiments have been performed that proves the increased
efficiency created by a deduplication system [8, 21, 28]. Creation
of centralised artefact whitelisting eliminates the known, benign
operating system and application files, and also eliminates known,
benign user created files. In addition, known illegal file artefacts can
be detected at an earliest stage possible, i.e., during the acquisition
phase.
Machine learning approaches offer a data driven solution, which
results in a more flexible solution compared with hard coded scripts.
In recent years, libraries such as scikit-learn 2 facilitate simple
and efficient data mining and data analysis. Researchers in many
fields look to machine learning techniques to improve the effective-
ness and efficiency of their solutions; the same is true in the digital
forensics and cybersecurity domains. For example, machine learn-
ing has been employed in malware classification [18], establishing
forensic analysis priorities [11], automated categorisation of digital
media [20], etc.
The research presented in this paper aims to improve the automa-
tion of the digital forensic investigative process. To achieve this
goal, a methodology is proposed to automatically determine suspi-
cious/relevant file artefacts encountered during the investigation.
Machine learning models were trained to perform this prediction
1https://caseontology.org/
2https://scikit-learn.org/
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task. A DFaaS system saved the expert human artefact classification,
i.e., illegal or benign, on the server, which provides training data
for the models. The experiments presented in this paper prove the
viability of this methodology.
1.1 Contribution of this Work
The contribution of this work can be summarised as:
• Design of an automatic digital forensic data processing ap-
proach to prioritise the investigation of suspicious file artefacts;
• Verification of the proposed methodology through an example
scenario;
• Creating a toolkit for data extraction form disk images, associ-
ated dataset generation,and pre-processing. This enables the
method to be performed automatically during the investigation;
• Analysis and discussion of the proposed solution in the field for
accelerating the processing of large volumes of digital evidence.
2 RELATEDWORK
Section 2.1 to 2.4 presents the existing methods and techniques on
expediting the process of digital forensic investigation and com-
bating the backlogs caused by the big data volumes. In addition,
how these techniques can be combined during the investigation
are discussed. In Section 2.5, the significant value of metadata and
timeline analysis to digital forensic investigation is outlined, and
associated tools and frameworks towards automatic metadata and
timeline analysis are presented.
2.1 Automatic Analysis
Automating the investigative process is challenging. Garfinkel [10]
pointed out that automation comes at great expense and has had
limited success. The path followed in a digital forensic investiga-
tion can vary substantially due to the investigation’s purpose, the
type of case, and the variety of devices encountered. A number of
process models have been defined, yet there is still no global stan-
dard procedure in practice. Hence, there is no existing, completely
automated approach to conduct investigations.
Numerous automatic tools have been developed in the research
and commercial fields that can assist the investigation process.
These tools aim to only reduce part of manual work during evi-
dence processing. Many automatic tools focus on data extraction.
However, automatic artefact examination is more challenging.
Attempting to chain existing automated tools achieves very lim-
ited progress to achieve this goal. This is due to the tools requiring
specific formats for input data, and the format of generated output
data can be incompatible with the next desired tool in the chain. Au-
tomatic processing is needed to improve the efficiency and reduce
inadvertent errors in digital forensic investigation [15]. In addition,
as described in the introduction, the large volume of data leads to
individual examiners being unable to fully understand it or use it
effectively. One arduous task that investigators have to perform is
connecting the dots [3].
Chen [5] outlines that merging analyses results from various
tools into a single case report is difficult. Hence, the automation
should be designed on a framework level, which means from the
start to the end of the process, the tools work together automatically.
Efforts have been made toward a higher level of automatic dig-
ital evidence processing. CASE aims to aggregate the extracted
information by various forensic tools in a standardised manner.
log2timeline3 is a tool that generates a “super timeline”, which
consists of digital events from the various files and logs discovered.
log2timeline uses parsers to extract digital events from a vari-
ety of file formats (e.g., NTFS $MFT, Microsoft IIS log files, SQLite
databases, Firefox Cache, Chrome preferences, etc.). However, ex-
isting analysis plug-ins provide very limited options.
2.2 DFaaS and Data Deduplication
The term Big Data Forensics was proposed as a new branch of digital
forensics by Zawoad et al. [29]. In the age of Big Data, there are
both new challenges and opportunities for digital forensics. Lillis
et al. [19] outlined the challenges faced by investigators; and one
of the most impactful is the ever increasing data volumes requiring
forensic analysis. Significant potential benefits for digital evidence
processing can be seen from a number of techniques such as data
mining, machine learning, and big data analytics.
In 2014, the HanskenDFaaS systemwas described by the NFI [26].
The system provides a service that processes high volumes of digital
material in a forensic context. This system had processed over a
petabyte of data, as of 2015 [27]. As the benefits outlined in [27],
DFaaS improves the efficiency of the investigation through offering
better resource management, collaboration and sharing knowledge,
etc.
One question to be noted is how DFaaS can work with the ex-
isting forensic process models. The DFaaS system from the NFI
is based on the Integrated Digital Forensic Process Model [17]. In
2017, Du et al. [7] discussed the evolution of digital forensic pro-
cess models, as well as an overview of the benefits of DFaaS to
existing process models. DFaaS is no longer a new paradigm and is
compatible with traditional evidence processing frameworks.
Employing data deduplication techniques to combat the big data
volume and expedite digital evidence processing has been discussed
in the literature [25, 28, 29]. For applying deduplication techniques,
a centralised database recording the known file artefacts is required.
This technique can work on top of the DFaaS framework. The
employment of data deduplication techniques effectively reduces
the data required to be processed during the investigation, and
potentially blacklisting enables a faster illegal file artefact detec-
tion [21, 25]. Experimentation has proven the significant savings
of the storage and the volumes of data processed in [21] and [8].
2.3 Prioritised Analysis
Even with the large number of devices and data involved in mod-
ern investigations, the forensic value of each artefact is not equal.
Conducting comprehensive analysis on all seized digital devices is
overly time consuming. How to quickly determine which data has
more pertinent value for manual examination is an open research
question in existing literature.
Triage is a term originally used in medical field; in digital foren-
sics, triage ranks seized digital devices in terms of importance or
priority [23]. Digital forensic triage is a method usually used for
getting faster responses to an incident for time-sensitive cases, such
3https://github.com/log2timeline/plaso/wiki
Automated Classification of Incriminating Digital Forensic Artefacts ARES ’19, August 26–29, 2019, Canterbury, United Kingdom
as child abuse, kidnapping, and terrorist threats [14]. When the vol-
ume of seized material is very large and only few devices might be
considered relevant for the investigation, how to quickly determine
which are the devices with the higher forensic value is paramount.
Prioritised analysis on file artefacts has become necessary in a
variety of cases. As the storage of each device is increasing, the
number of file artefacts on a device could be huge. Manual exam-
ination of each file artefact could take a long time. Conventional
methods rely on the hash-based filtering and keyword indexing to
search for relevant file artefacts. In recent years, researchers have
proposed metadata-based clustering methods for grouping similar
file artefacts to assist the investigators. Document clustering has
also been used for forensic analysis [6].
2.4 Machine Learning in Digital Forensics
Machine learning-based techniques have beenwidely applied across
diverse fields. Deep learning, as another subcategory of artificial
intelligence, really shines when dealing with complex problems
such as image classification, nature language processing, and speech
recognition. A number of methods have been proposed to develop
intelligent methods for problem solving in digital forensics.
An approach for computer user identification was presented
by Grillo et al. in order to quickly classify seized devices [11]. The
proposed method for identifying the individual computer user lever-
aged the user’s habits, computer skill level, online interests, etc.
User profiling resulted in five categories being identified: occasional
users, Internet chat users, office worker users, experienced users,
and hacker users. This approach prioritised the analysis of seized
hard drives; forensic examiners could examine only potentially
relevant hard drive images resulting in a reduced analysis time.
Triage in forensic investigation has been discussed in Section 2.3
and using machine learning technique to conduct triage on seized
devices was discussed. Marturana et al. [20] presented a triage
method for the categorisation of digital media. The features ex-
tracted from the seized devices were based on the connections to
specific crimes under investigation. Two use cases were presented
in this paper; one involved copyright infringement, while the other
involved child sexual abuse investigation. The crime-related fea-
tures were defined by the researchers, which resulted in models
being relevant for the case categories defined, but may not be ap-
plicable to real cases directly.
2.5 Metadata Forensics and Timeline
Examination
Typical questions often asked in digital forensic investigation in-
clude: when, where, what, why, and how the incident happened [4].
Metadata refers to data about data and it usually plays significant
role in digital forensic investigation. The precise information con-
tained in metadata varies depending on the file system and file type.
Generally, metadata consists of file modification time stamps, file
ownership information, and data units allocated to this metadata
unit [1]. In digital forensic investigation, file system metadata is
typically used for 1) keyword searching to find out a specific type of
file artefact, e.g., based on the file type; 2) filtering the file artefacts
based on file size, creation time, and so on [10].
In recent years, metadata has also been applied for automatic
forensic investigation. Rowe and Garfinkel [24] outlined a method-
ology that uses directory metadata (file names, extensions, paths,
size, access/modification times, fragmentation, status flags and hash
codes) on a large corpus to find out anomalous and suspicious file
artefacts. In 2013, Raghavan and Raghavan [22] demonstrated the
use of metadata associations to determine the origin of downloaded
files.
Digital forensic analysis attempts to reconstruct the events that
have occurred on the seized device(s) pertaining to a case. Creating
a timeline of system activity is capable of assisting the investigators
in the discovery of useful traces for the case. Inglot et al. claimed
that there is a need for a comprehensive timeline analysis tool [16].
Hargreaves et al. [13] proposed an automated timeline recon-
struction approach for generating high-level events, which reduced
the number of events to be analysed. One problem highlighted by
these authors is that separate neural networks are required to be
trained for different applications and a new data set of file system
activity would be required for newer versions of applications. More
general purpose analysers are needed for digital event correlation.
log2timeline and plaso 4 [12] appears to be the tool of choice
for timeline generation and analysis over recent years. It is a tool
designed to extract timestamps (of digital events) from various of
log files found on a typical computer system and aggregate them.
log2timeline analysers conduct the preliminary discovery of the
digital events contained on a device. However, analysers generat-
ing useful information through digital events correlation must be
developed to enable an automated evidence analysis process.
3 METHODOLOGY
Traditional, hash-based white-listing or blacklisting methods are
usually the go-to automatic solution for finding known file artefacts
during a digital forensic investigation. If nothing pertinent has been
detected, the investigators will have to manually perform keyword
search or filter to examine the artefacts. Using hash matching to
detect illegal files can only detect the precisely same file artefacts or
artefacts with a minor change (i.e., by using approximate matching).
This research presents an approach that enables automatic deter-
mination of suspicious file artefacts by training machine learning
models. The associated metadata and digital events occurred are
employed to extracting features of each file artefact. Combining
this with a centralised, deduplicated digital evidence processing
framework, illegal file artefacts encountered in previous cases are
labelled as such in the database. These files on the blacklist can
be used to train classifiers for detecting previous unencountered
suspicious file artefacts in new cases.
3.1 The Relevancy Determination Process
Figure 1 illustrates the designed work-flow of this methodology as
could be applied in an investigation. From a raw format image copy
to the prediction result, the process is completely automated. The
processing is broken down in four steps:
4https://github.com/log2timeline/plaso/wiki
ARES ’19, August 26–29, 2019, Canterbury, United Kingdom Du and Scanlon
Trained ML Model
DFaaS system
Known DB
Raw Images of Seized Devices
Prediction
Result
Dataset for Training
Dataset for Prediction
Step 1:
Dataset
Generation
Step 2:
Filtering
Known File Artefacts
Unknown File Artefacts
Dataset of File Artefacts
Step 3:
Training the Model
Step 4: 
Prediciton
Figure 1: Overview of Methodology: the work-flow of the proposed methodology in an investigation.
(1) Dataset Generation - The developed toolkit is used to gen-
erate the training dataset in csv format for machine learning-
based modelling. The details on how this dataset is generated
is presented in Section 3.2.
(2) Filtering - It works through comparing the hash with the
known database, which will split the file artefacts into two
categories; known file artefacts and unknown file artefacts.
(3) Training the Model - Training a model using known file
artefacts. The features used will be described in Section 3.4.
(4) Prediction - The categorisation of the previously unencoun-
tered files are predicted by the trained model (i.e., if it is
relevant or suspicious to the investigation).
Through the above process, from the raw image input, an initial
automatic analysis result can be performed automatically. The out-
put is a prediction of each artefact as suspicious or not to assist the
investigator in identifying the file artefacts likely relevant to the
investigation.
3.2 Toolkit for Data Extraction and Processing
Generated Dataset
Metadata of File Artefacts
Digital Events
Metadata Extractor
Log2timeline
Data Pre-processing
Raw Images of 
Seized Devices
Figure 2: Toolkit for Data Extraction and Processing
Figure 2 shows how the dataset for training is generated from
a raw disk image. There are three parts at this stage: 1) metadata
extraction using the python library pytsk 5; 2) digital events ex-
traction using log2timeline; 3) merging the metadata and digital
events to a dataset for file artefacts. The tools for metadata and
digital events extraction operate directly on raw disk image. The
input is disk image in raw format. The output is a file in csv format.
The metadata extraction tool uses pytsk. Pytsk is a Python bind-
ing for the Sleuth Kit. In this research, it was used to extract the
file system metadata. The timeline generated using log2timeline
consists of the digital events from the file system, windows reg-
istry, browsing history, download history, etc. Each event describes
source, the file name, event type, etc.
In the generated timeline, each row represents a digital event and
the inode can identify which file artefact it is related to. The inode
can be used to collate all of the digital events associated with each
file artefact. If multiple partitions are involved, a combination of
hash and inode must be used to keep this unique identifier. The
combination of metadata and timeline results in an abundance
of information related to each file artefacts. More details on the
extracted data is presented in Section 3.3.
3.3 File System Metadata and Timeline
The importance of metadata analysis in an investigation process
has been discussed in Section 2.5. The specific file system metadata
considered useful and exploited in this research are:
• File name;
• File size;
• inode;
• File hash value (MD5/SHA1/SHA256);
• Physical address of file;
• The number of blocks of the file;
• The block number(s) allocated to the file;
5https://github.com/py4n6/pytsk
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• Creation time of the file;
• Last access time of the file;
• Last modification time of the file.
Timelines contain more information than just timestamps. The
“super timeline” generated by log2timeline consists of what hap-
pened, when it happened, on which artefact, and where each digital
event was recorded on the system. A complete list of the fields of
generated timeline are categorised and listed as follows:
• Fields describing the event:
– date - Date that the event occurred;
– time - Time that the event occurred;
– MACB - Modification, access, creation and birth times;
– desc - A description of the timestamp object;
– short - A shorter version description of the timestamp;
– filename - The file object on which the event occurred;
– sourcetype - Description of the source type, e.g., “Opera
Browser History”;
– source - A shorted form of the source, e.g., “WEBHIST”;
– type -Timestamp type, e.g., “Last Time Executed”.
• Fields describing the source:
– inode - The inode or MFT number of the parsed artefacts;
– user - The user owns the parsed artefacts;
– host - The host that the data came from.
• Fields describing the tool used:
– version - the version of the tool;
– timezone - Timezone where applying the tool generating
the timeline;
– format - The parsing module.
• Fields describing other information:
– notes - An operational field;
– extra - A reference to a hash that stores all additional fields
that might be used.
3.4 Feature Extraction from Metadata and
Timeline
In training machine learning models, not every feature available
proves valuable. For example, randomly generated numerical fea-
tures, artefact hash values, or inode values are not helpful to the
prediction task. Feature manipulation is usually needed for a spe-
cific task or purpose for each machine learning model. Trough
feature transformation, the information input for model training
can be added, changed or removed as desired for each task. In fact,
the resultant model is a way of constructing a new feature that
solves the task at hand [9].
Standalone metadata, such as filename and timestamp, are likely
not suitable to use directly for training classification models. Table 1
lists the useful metadata and the corresponding features that can
be extracted, manipulated, and transformed.
3.5 Evaluation Matrix
Due to the severe imbalance of the dataset, accuracy is not used to
evaluate the performance. Because a model can predict the value of
themajority class for all predictions and achieve a high classification
accuracy, this model is not useful in the problem domain.
The performance metrics used are precision, recall and F1-score:
Table 1: Valuable Feature Extracted
Metadata Features Extracted
Timestamp Day of the week, time of day, the num-
ber of years/months/days/hours of file
created/last access/modified, etc.
Filename Length of filename, character types in
the filename, language, etc.
File Type Type of file, for example, image, docu-
ment, executable, etc. This is based on
file header information as opposed to
file extensions.
Owner Username of the file creator.
File Size Categorising the size in KB.
File Path Depth of the directory; depth is defined
as the number of parent directories in
the hierarchical filesystem.
Digital Events The number of associated events oc-
curred on the file artefacts in total;
the number of the events occurred
on the file artefacts on/in a specific
day/week/month; the most frequent
type/source of events happened; and so
on.
• Precision is the fraction of relevant instances among the
retrieved instances:
precision = TP/(TP + FP);
• Recall is the fraction of relevant instances that have been
retrieved:
recall = TP/(TP + FN);
• F1-Score is an overall measure of a model’s accuracy that
combines precision and recall:
F1-Score = 2*recall*precision.
3.6 Comparison with the Existing Methodology
Differentiating this approach from previous research on using meta-
data to cluster the file artefacts, this research leverages expert hu-
man analysis results from the manual processing previous investi-
gations. The hypothesis that the features of analysed file artefacts
can enable trained machine learning models to determine how
relevant newly encountered file artefacts are to a specific type of
investigation. The experiment presented in Section 4 explores this
hypothesis.
One advantage of the proposed method is performing supervised
machine learning tasks on the investigated file artefacts; the au-
tomated categorisation can more directly steer the investigator’s
focus towards pertinent data at the earliest possible stage. Lastly,
this research presents a complete overview of how this method can
be applied in real-world investigative scenario.
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4 EXPERIMENTATION AND RESULTS
This section outlines the dataset generation, the structure of the
dataset, the machine learning models trained and the performance
of the results are evaluated.
Labelled DatasetUnlabelled Dataset
Govdoc1 Files
MD5/SHA1 Hash of Files
Metadata
Digital Events
Pytsk
Plaso
Illegal Files
Windows Disk Images
Figure 3: Dataset Generation - 1) Disk image creation;
2) Metadata and timeline generation; 3) Merging the two
sources (each sample in the dataset represents a single file
artefact); 4) Labelling the data (file artefacts from Govdoc1
Corpus are defined as “illegal”).
4.1 Experimentation Dataset
In this section, the creation of dataset used in the experiment is
outlined. As shown in figure 3, the process of experimental dataset
generation includes:
(1) Emulating wear-and-tear of the device on a virtual environ-
ment and planting the “illegal” file artefacts on the test virtual
machine;
(2) Using the developed tool to extract filesystem metadata and a
“super timeline” from the disk image;
(3) Merging the information about file artefacts from two sources
(i.e., the extracted timeline and metadata);
(4) Labelling the file artefacts on the dataset based on the hash of
file artefacts.
The disk images used in this research areWindows 7 disk images.
Emulated wear and tear actions (surfing the Internet, installing
software, downloading files from browsers, etc.) were conducted
in a virtual environment. The Govdocs16 dataset were defined as
6https://digitalcorpora.org/corpora/files
“known illegal” file artefacts (Govdocs1 consists of almost 1 million
freely-redistributable files of various formats and sizes).
4.2 Example Scenario
In child abuse material possession/distribution investigation cases,
pertinent digital evidence often consists of multimedia content
with similar file size, under same directory, very close creation time,
last access time, etc. The proposed methodology aims to detect
suspicious files in such investigative scenarios. Hence, file artefacts
with a similar number of associated events, file type, similar path
on the device with known illegal file artefacts should likely be
predicted as suspicious/relevant.
Based on the purpose of the prediction task, the complete matrix
of the features are:
• Depth of Dir - Integer representing the depth of the file direc-
tory (i.e., the number of parent directories);
• File Extension - Categorical data type;
• Length of Name - An integer representing the filename’s
length.
• Creation Time (y) - How many years old is the file;
• Creation Time (m) - How many months old is the file;
• Creation Time (d) - How many days old is the file;
• Creation Time (h) - How many hours old is the file;
• Size - The data size of file in KB;
• Count - The number of associated file events;
• Class - If the file benign or illegal. (the value is 0 for the benign
files, 1 for the illegal files).
4.3 Result Discussion
Several machine learning classification algorithms including Lo-
gistic Regression, k-NN, Support Vector Machine, Decision Tree,
GaussianNaïve Bayes are tested in the experimentation. The datasets
used in the experiment were generated using the toolkit presented
in Section 3.2. Table 2 shows the generated datasets used in this
experiment; mainly differing on the percentage of illegal artefacts.
The dataset is split into training and testing data.
Dataset No. of Artefacts Benign Artefacts Illegal Artefacts
Dataset1 42,326 41,339 987
Dataset2 55,296 49,328 5,968
Table 2: Datasets Used in the Experiment
Precision-Recall curves summarise the trade-off between the
true positive rate and the positive predictive value for a predic-
tive model using different probability thresholds. For getting an
overall understanding of the models’ performance, Precision-Recall
curve (RP curve) is visualised and average precision score (AP score)
is calculated. Figure 4 shows the RP curve of the employed algo-
rithms on dataset1. Comparison of the average precision score,
the performance of models from best to worst are Decision Tree,
Gaussian Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machine, k-NN, and Logistic
Regression respectively.
As the practical usage of the trained model is for digital forensic
investigation, more concern should be put on the classifying of
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Figure 4: Precision-Recall Curves per Classifier with Corresponding Average Precision (AP) Scores
illegal files (class 1). Precisely, the precision, recall and F1 score on
class 1, instead of the average value on class 0 and class 1, should
be used to represents the performance of the models. The scores
shown in Table 3 are on the class 1. This table shows an evaluation
matrix from two datasets.
As shown in Table 3, it is obvious that the performance with
dataset2 is significantly better than dataset1. This happens is
because the number of “illegal” file samples in dataset2 is more
than dataset1. The imbalanced class problem is apparent in these
datasets. The datasets were created in this manner due to the as-
sumption that only a subset of the “illegal” files are classified as
known illegal/known benign from the centralised database.
An overview on the models’ settings and performance analyses,
as shown in Figure 4, is listed below:
• Decision Tree - Observing from the AP score and precision,
recall and F1 scores, the Decision Tree classifier performs best
for both datasets compared against other models. In addition,
the performance is stable on the different datasets.
• Gaussian Naïve Bayes - The performance of Gaussian Naïve
Bayes on dataset1 is worse than dataset2. Even though the
AP score is good, the scores on class 1 is much worse. For this
severely imbalanced dataset, the score for the class with less
samples is very low.
• k-NN - One important parameter for k-NN is the selection of k.
In this experiment, the model achieved its best accuracy when
k was set to be 5.
• Support Vector Machine - Through experimentation, the
model realises a poor performance when the given data is not
normalised. Hence, the dataset is normalised before it is fed into
the model whose parameters are left default for the experiment.
• Logistic Regression requires quite large sample sizes, which
could be the reason it scores lower comparing with the other
models.
The performance of these models indicates that the proposed
methodology is valid and justifies further exploration. Among the
aforementioned algorithms, Decision Tree achieved the best per-
formance. The percentage distribution of the file artefacts among
the different classes can be various in the real-world investigation.
Different distribution of illegal file and benign file dataset should be
tested for giving further conclusion which model is more suitable
for specific scenarios.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper outlines an automatic approach to use machine learning
models to predict which file artefacts are likely pertinent to an
investigation (i.e. which file artefacts are likely more suspicious
than others). It is designed to integrate with a DFaaS framework,
rather than a stand alone experiment on an individual device. The
associated toolkit was introduced that was developed for support-
ing the automation of some the digital forensic process. An example
scenario was outlined and tested indicating the feasibility and effec-
tiveness of the proposed methodology. The promising experimental
results for suspicious artefact detection provides motivation for
further research.
5.1 Future Work
Future work in this ares will focus on:
• Generating more scenarios - This experimental scenario used
in this paper was child abuse material possession and distri-
bution investigation. The purpose of this case type is to find
out files with similar size, directory, creation time, etc. More
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Algorithms datsaset1 datsaset2 Short Summary
precision recall f1-score precision recall f1-score
Decision Trees 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 Best models in this experiment
Gaussian Naïve Bayes 0.16 0.97 0.27 0.99 1.00 0.99 Performance influenced by the dataset very much
k-NN 0.79 0.71 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 Better performance on dataset2
Support Vector Machines 0.82 0.52 0.64 1.00 1.00 1.00 Better performance on dataset2
Logistic Regression 0.71 0.67 0.69 0.99 1.00 0.99 Better performance on dataset2
Table 3: Evaluation Matrix of Different Classification Algorithms and Datasets
investigative scenarios will be designed and evaluated. For ex-
ample, training models for determining suspicious files through
each origin source (from email attachment, Cloud account, USB
device, etc.), third party owner, etc.
• More exploration is required on the extent of imbalanced classes
influences each model’s performance. Form the conducted ex-
periment in this paper, it was shown that the dataset can influ-
ence the performance of the models. In the future work, more
diverse datasets will be generated for testing. The generation
of these datasets should provide a broad variety on the ratios
of the benign/illegal files.
• Exploring appropriate feature selection and feature engineer-
ing approaches for the defined machine learning tasks. In this
paper, the features are selected by the common knowledge of
digital forensic investigation. One avenue of exploration that
could improve the performance is extracting as many features
as possible initially, and subsequently selecting from them by
using techniques such as SelectBest, RFE (Recursive Feature Elim-
ination), and PCA (Principal Component Analysis).
• Tuning the model so that it can fit needs of real investigative
scenarios better. For example, to focus on the recall scores,
rather than insisting on a higher precision. Because, in any
digital forensic investigation, any pertinent inculpatory or ex-
culpatory file artefact can not be inadvertently overlooked.
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